Florida Law Review
Volume 61

Issue 4

Article 12

September 2009

Setting The “Persecutor Bar” For Political Asylum After Negusie
David A. Karp

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David A. Karp, Setting The “Persecutor Bar” For Political Asylum After Negusie, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 933 (2009).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/12

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Karp: Setting The “Persecutor Bar” For Political Asylum After Negusie

SETTING THE “PERSECUTOR BAR” FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM
AFTER NEGUSIE
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009)
David A. Karp∗
After night fell in the port city of Massawra, Eritrea, Daniel Girmai
Negusie slipped out of the military prison where he had been held for
four years.1 During the day, he hid at a friend’s house; at night, he
swam out to container ships anchored off the coast of the Red Sea.2 On
his fifth night, Negusie, twenty-eight years old, slipped into a luggage
container with an air hole aboard a tanker, the Atlantic Forest.3 He said
later that he did not know where the ship was headed.4
When the Atlantic Forest arrived a month later on December 14,
2004, in Morehead City, North Carolina, crew members found Negusie
and two other stowaways inside the containers.5 Negusie had the
equivalent of $10.60 in Eritrean money on him.6
Negusie told immigration officials that if sent back to Eritrea, he
would be killed for deserting7 and for converting to Christianity.8 He
applied for political asylum9 and withholding of removal10 from the
United States based on a “well-founded fear of persecution.”11 But an
immigration judge denied his application,12 and the Board of
∗ J.D. 2009, University of Florida Levin College of Law. B.A. 1995, Yale University.
This Comment is dedicated to Professor Dennis Calfee, whose generosity knows no bounds.
Also thanks to Professor Lea Johnston for her close reading of this Comment and to the editors
of the Florida Law Review for their friendship and diligent work on this Comment.
1. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 15, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009)
(No. 07-499).
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also CIA, The World Factbook, Eritrea, Map, https://www.cia.gov/library/pub
lications/the-world-factbook/geos/er.html (last visited June 26, 2009).
4. Government Exhibit No. 1, Record of Sworn Statement in Proceedings under Section
235(b)(1) of the Act, Negusse v. Gonzales , 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 2007) (No. 061382).
5. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 15; Record of Sworn Statement,
supra note 4, at 2; see also Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615, at *1.
6. Record of Sworn Statement, supra note 4, at 2; see also CoinMill.com-The Currency
Converter, Eritrean Nakfa and United States Dollars, http://coinmill.com/ERN_USD.html#ERN
=160 (last visited June 26, 2009).
7. Record of Sworn Statement, supra note 4, at 3.
8. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 14. Record of Sworn Statement,
supra note 4, at 3.
9. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (West 2008); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(West 2009).
10. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (West 2006).
11. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A). An applicant must show that he is unable or
unwilling to return to his country because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion . . . .” Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1).
12. Government Exhibit No. 7, Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, Negusse v.
933
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Immigration Appeals (BIA)13 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.14
While the immigration judge found that Negusie had been
conscripted into the army and then abused in prison in Eritrea,15 the
judge also determined that Negusie had been forced to work as a prison
guard, a position in which he helped punish others.16 Thus, federal law
treated Negusie both as a victim and as a perpetrator.17 Although he had
been forced—at gunpoint—to act as an accomplice to persecution,18
federal law imposed a black-and-white bar on granting political asylum
to anyone who helped persecute others.19 The law did not allow
immigration officials to consider the moral culpability of the persecutor,
or to evaluate whether the persecutor was coerced.20 As the Fifth Circuit
explained, “The question whether an alien was compelled to assist
authorities is irrelevant, as is the question whether the alien shared the
authorities’ intentions.”21
With help from a group of Yale law students,22 Negusie appealed to
Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 2007) (No. 06-1382). Many of the court
documents spell Daniel Girmai Negusie’s name different ways, and INS officials originally
processed him as Daniel Nugsa-Ghirmay. See Government Exhibit No. 3 at 2, Record of
Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, Negusse v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1,
2007) (No. 06-1382). Negusie—who may have limited knowledge of English—spelled his own
name incorrectly in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus he filed while imprisoned at the
Tensas Paris Detention Center in Waterproof, Louisiana. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 at 1, Negusse v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1,
2007) (No. 06-1382). Despite this confusion, all the cited cases refer to the same person.
13. Government Exhibit No. 9, Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, In re
Daniel Girmai Negusie at 3, Negusse v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 2007)
(No. 06-1382).
14. Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x. 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007).
15. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 12, at 7, 11–12. While the judge
had doubts about Negusie’s testimony, the judge found Negusie’s testimony “largely credible”
and accepted that the testimony reflected what actually happened. Id. at 7, 12.
16. Id. at 9–11.
17. Because the immigration judge found that Negusie participated in persecution of a
protected class under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2009), he denied him political asylum
and withholding of removal. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 12, at 9–10.
However, the judge found that Negusie would likely be tortured if returned to Eritrea. Id. at 13.
Therefore, the judge deferred removal under the Convention Against Torture. Id. at 14. Deferral,
unlike withholding or political asylum, does not entitle Negusie to remain permanently in the
United States. See Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 16 & n.5. Negusie may
be detained at any time by the Department of Homeland Security and may be deported to a
country where he is not likely to be tortured. See id.
18. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 15.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (West 2008); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (West 2009). The
statute states: “The term ‘refugee’ does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
20. Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x. 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007).
21. Id. (citing Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003)).
22. Press Release, Yale Law School, Supreme Court Clinic Wins Victory No. 2 in
Negusie v. Holder (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/news/9252.htm.
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the United States Supreme Court.23 In March, the Court reversed.24 In
an 8-to-1 decision,25 the Court held that federal law did not require
officials evaluating Negusie’s political asylum application to ignore
whether he had been coerced into persecuting others.26 But rather than
decide the full meaning of the federal law, the Court sent Negusie’s
case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals.27 It instructed the BIA,
an executive arm of the Justice Department whose members are
appointed by and serve the Attorney General,28 to first interpret the
ambiguity in the law.29
By remanding the case back to the executive branch, the Court
displayed the type of “judicial modesty” that Chief Justice John G.
Roberts, Jr. has touted as a hallmark of judicial restraint.30 The Court’s
limited decision allowed the Court to speak with near unanimity and
eliminated any appearance that the Court was crafting immigration
policy from the bench. The decision also placed the complicated public
policy choice at the heart of Negusie’s case before the politicallyaccountable executive branch. It allowed Attorney General Eric Holder
to craft immigration policy that balances international relations,
humanitarian concerns, and America’s intolerance of persecution.
Yet, as Justice John Paul Stevens argued in a separate opinion,31 the
Court did not abdicate its responsibility to “say what the law is.”32 The
Court reserved the right under the Chevron doctrine33 to review the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1161 (2009). Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion,
which was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., Justice David Souter, Justice Samuel
Alito and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Id. at 1162. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, id. at
1176 (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Stephen Breyer concurred
in part and dissented in part, id. at 1170 (Stevens, J. and Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), and Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel Alito filed a separate
concurring opinion, id. at 1168 (Scalia, J. and Alito, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 1162 (majority opinion).
27. Id.
28. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, BD. OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRAC. MANUAL 1, § 1.1(a), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm (last visited June 26, 2009); U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals,
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited June 26, 2009).
29. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167–68.
30. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005)
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.). For another discussion of judicial modesty, see
William H. Pryor Jr., The Perspective of a Junior Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1007 (2008).
31. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
33. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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BIA’s interpretation to ensure that it complied with Congress’ intent.34
Thus, Negusie stands as an example of the Roberts Court’s pragmatism
and shows the wisdom of deferring to the political branches in close
calls of statutory interpretation.35
The complexity of Negusie’s case, which presented questions of
foreign affairs, international law, and Congress’ plenary immigration
power, illustrates why courts so often ask the political branches to settle
these types of policy issues. Negusie was born in the Horn of Africa, a
region beset by malnutrition, human rights abuses, and war. Almost
two-thirds of Ethiopia’s population is illiterate,36 and an estimated
980,000 people live with AIDS.37 According to Amnesty International,
human rights violations are rampant amid this poverty.38 The Eritrean
government banned minority religions in 2002, arrested hundreds of
believers, and held them without trial.39 The government regularly
jails—and sometimes tortures—political opponents, and forces children
into military service.40 If children try to escape conscription, they may
be killed or their family members may be tortured.41
Negusie was eighteen years old when soldiers surrounded a movie
theater in Eritrea and forced him into labor.42 He worked for a month in
a salt mine before being pressed into military service.43 He served as a
34. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1168.
35. This Comment does not consider whether, as a general matter, the Roberts Court has
displayed judicial modesty in the body of its work. For a discussion of that broader topic, see
Roger Pilon, Foreword: The Roberts Court Emerges: Restrained or Active? to ROGER PILON &
MARK MOLLER, CATO: SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 2006–2007, at vii (2007); Frank B. Cross,
Chief Justice Roberts and Precedent: A Preliminary Study, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1251 (2008); David
J. Garrow, Response, The Three Rs: Rosen, Roberts, and Restraint, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 13
(2007); Douglas W. Kmiec, Overview of the Term: The Rule of Law & Roberts’s Revolution of
Restraint, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 495 (2007); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis,
and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533 (2008); Mark Tushnet, The First
(and Last?) Term of the Roberts Court, 42 TULSA L. REV. 495 (2007).
36. Country
Profile:
Ethiopia,
BBC
N EWS ,
Apr.
15,
2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072164.stm (last visited June 26, 2009).
37. CIA, The World Factbook, Ethiopia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/et.html (last visited June 26, 2009).
38. AMNESTY INT’L, ERITREA–AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2008, at 1 (2008),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/Eritrea/report-2008.
39. Id.; see also AMNESTY INT’L, ERITREA: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION 15–17 (2005),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR64/013/2005/en/62b61e58-d49911dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/afr640132005en.pdf. In 2002, Eritrea officially recognized the
Orthodox, Catholic, and Lutheran churches, as well as Islam. About half of the country is
Orthodox Christian, and about 48% is Islamic. Profile: Eritrea, U.S. Department of State, April
2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2854.htm (last visited June 26, 2009).
40. AMNESTY INT’L, ERITREA: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 39, at 16.
41. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR 2006,
COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: AFRICA: ERITREA (2007), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78733.htm.
42. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 13.
43. Id. at 14.
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gunner on a boat patrolling the Red Sea, but said he never fired on
anyone during his tour.44 When the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia
erupted again, Negusie refused to fight.45 Negusie’s captors placed him
in solitary confinement for six months, and then forced him into hard
labor for a year and a half.46 When Negusie converted to Protestant
Christianity in prison, he said he was punished for two weeks.47 For
talking to fellow Christians in the prison, guards beat him and forced
him to roll on the ground in the hot sun.48
In 2001, nearly seven years after he was first taken, Negusie’s
captors told him to serve as a prison guard.49 If he refused, they would
kill him.50 By accepting the post, Negusie arguably moved in the eyes
of American law from victim to accomplice. As a guard, he carried a
gun.51 He was posted at the prison’s gate to prevent prisoners from
leaving.52 He also kept prisoners from showering and getting fresh air.53
Negusie saw at least one person die after being left for two hours in
intense heat without water.54 He stood by and did nothing.55
Although a guard, Negusie was also a prisoner.56 Negusie carried a
gun, but he was not allowed to leave the prison.57 When he disobeyed
orders, Negusie was punished.58 Negusie also tried to help prisoners
when he could. At night, he let inmates take showers in secret.59 He
smuggled food, water, and cigarettes to prisoners from time to time.60
Despite Negusie’s aid to prisoners and his own prisoner status, the
Fifth Circuit held that even Negusie’s limited participation in
persecution prevented him from receiving political asylum in the United
States.61 Under federal law, it did not matter that Negusie may have
been forced into persecuting others. In reaching this conclusion, the
44. Id.
45. Id. Negusie, who was born in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa and whose mother
is Ethiopian, refused to fight against Ethiopia because he said he considered Ethiopians his
“brothers.” Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 14–15.
50. Id.
51. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1162 (2009).
52. Id.
53. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1162–63.
54. Id. at 1163.
55. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 12, at 6; see also Negusie, 129 S.
Ct. at 1163.
56. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 15.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007).
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Fifth Circuit relied first on its own interpretation in Bah v. Ashcroft62
that “the syntax of the statute suggests that the alien’s personal
motivation is not relevant.”63 The court reasoned that if Congress had
wanted to make the alien’s motivation an issue, it could have drafted the
law to reflect this goal.64
The Fifth Circuit, similar to other circuits that have interpreted the
persecutor bar,65 also based its decision on the Supreme Court’s holding
in Fedorenko v. United States.66 In Fedorenko, the Court found no mens
rea requirement in the Displaced Persons Act’s (DPA) persecutor bar.67
Because the Court found no intent requirement in the DPA, other
circuits reasoned that the persecutor bar for political asylum claims
likewise did not require intent.68
Fedorenko involved a Nazi guard who had worked at the infamous
Treblinka concentration camp and applied after the war for U.S.
citizenship under the DPA.69 Congress passed the DPA in 1948 to allow
European refugees to emigrate to the United States, but excluded any
person who “‘assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ians]’
or . . . ‘voluntarily
assisted
the
enemy
forces . . . in
their
70
71
operations. . . .’” Fedorenko lied on his visa application, and when
62. 341 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).
63. Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003). Bah reflects the type of horrific
cases that U.S. Immigration & Custom Enforcement evaluates. Amadu Bah lived in Koidu,
Sierra Leone, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) captured his family, incinerated his
father, raped and killed his sister, and then threatened to kill Bah if he refused to join the RUF.
Id. at 349. As an RUF member, Bah was ordered to shoot female prisoners and used a machete
to chop off the hands, legs, and heads of civilians. Id. at 350. When he refused, soldiers poured
palm oil on his back and placed him on his back to burn him. Id. He escaped by stealing the
British passport of a tourist in Sierra Leone’s capital, and used it to fly through the United
Kingdom to Houston, Texas, where he applied for political asylum. Id at 349–50.
64. Id.
65. Several circuit courts of appeals split on whether the persecutor bar permitted the
government to consider an applicant’s intent. The Fifth and Second Circuits held that the law
did not allow the government to consider intent. See id. at 351; Xie v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 434 F.3d 136, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2006). The Eighth Circuit disagreed.
Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 814–15 (8th Cir. 2001). The First and Ninth Circuits, while
not directly addressing the issue, suggested that the persecutor bar contemplated a person’s
moral culpability. Castañeda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2007); Vukmirovic
v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1251–53 (9th Cir. 2004).
66. See Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Fedorenko v.
United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981)).
67. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.
68. See Xie, 434 F.3d at 141 (“[I]nasmuch as the INA and the DPA were enacted for
similar purposes—to enable refugees to find sanctuary in the United States in the wake of
World War II—we find it unlikely that the phrase ‘assisted in persecution’ implicitly includes a
voluntariness requirement in one statute but not the other.”). Note that the persecutor bar in the
1980 Refugee Act amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) discussed in Xie. See
Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1162.
69. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 494–98.
70. Id. at 495 (citation omitted).
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the government discovered his true identity, Fedorenko argued that the
Nazis had forced him to serve as a concentration camp guard.72 Because
Congress had included the word “voluntary” in one part of the DPA, the
Fedorenko Court reasoned that the absence of the word “voluntary” in
another subpart of the DPA meant that Congress wanted to exclude all
persons who persecuted others—whether they were coerced to do so or
not.73 “‘We are not at liberty to imply a condition which is opposed to
the explicit term of the statute,’” the Court wrote.74 “‘To [so] hold . . . is
not to construe the Act but to amend it.’”75
In Negusie, the Court wrote that the Fifth Circuit, four other circuit
courts, and the BIA made a mistake by relying on Fedorenko.76
Fedorenko interpreted the World War II-era DPA, passed in 1948 to
deal with “the Holocaust and its horror.”77 The Refugee Act of 1980,
which governed Negusie’s political asylum claims, came from a
different era. Congress passed the Refugee Act to implement
immigration policy broadly,78 particularly after the Indochina “boat
people” refugee crisis and the resettlement of thousands of Soviet Jews
at the end of the Cold War.79
Moreover, the Refugee Act did not contain the same textual
structure so critical to the interpretation of the DPA in Fedorenko. In
the DPA, Congress included “voluntary” in one part of the statute, but
not in another subpart.80 This absence arguably demonstrated Congress’
intent. By contrast, Congress did not use “voluntary” in any subpart of
the 1980 Refugee Act, “so its omission cannot carry the same
significance,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court.81 These two
71. Id. at 496, 509.
72. Id. at 500–01.
73. Id. at 512–14 (“The plain language of the Act mandates precisely the literal
interpretation that the District Court rejected: an individual’s service as a concentration camp
armed guard—whether voluntary or involuntary—made him ineligible for a visa.”).
74. Id. at 513 (quoting Detroit Trust Co. v. Barlum S.S. Co., 293 U.S. 21, 38 (1934)).
75. Id.
76. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164 (2009).
77. Id. at 1165–66.
78. Id.
79. See Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 145–46
(1981).
80. The government pointed out, however, that the INA contains other provisions that
mention voluntariness. For example, the law does not bar a person who was an “involuntary”
member of a totalitarian party from admission to the United States. Brief for the Respondent in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009)
(No. 07-499) (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(ii) (West 2009); 8 U.S.C. § 1424(d) (2006)).
Negusie’s attorneys countered that the provisions cited by the government do not deal with
persecution or asylum, and were passed in 1952, twenty-eight years before Congress inserted
the 1980 persecutor bar. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 45 & n.13. Thus,
the existence of voluntariness in an earlier, different part of the statute does not show anything
about Congress’ intent in 1980. Id. at 45 n.13.
81. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1165.
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differences show why “Fedorenko, which addressed a different statute
enacted for a different purpose, does not control the BIA’s
interpretation of this persecutor bar” in Negusie.82
By casting aside the importance of Fedorenko, the Court in Negusie
decided that the persecutor bar did not prohibit the government from
considering an applicant’s culpability in persecuting others.83 But
Negusie wanted the Court to take its decision one step further—and
declare that the statute required the government to consider
culpability.84 Instead,85 the Court asked the executive branch to interpret
the law first.86
In doing so, the Court argued that the interpretation of the law rested
primarily in the agency’s, rather than the Court’s, hands.87 Under the
Chevron doctrine, courts engage in a two-step analysis of the law. First,
courts ask whether Congress created a gap that it intended agencies to
fill. Second, courts ask if the agency’s interpretation of the gap is
reasonable. If so, courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation.88 The
Court gives particular deference to immigration officials, who
“‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate
questions of foreign relations.’”89
On one hand, the Court’s choice to remand the case to the BIA—a
board appointed by the Attorney General to act as his agent—raises
profound questions about our system of separation of powers.90 If the
82. Id. at 1166.
83. Id.
84. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 32.
85. Justice Antonin Scalia made it clear that the BIA could interpret the statute in the
exact same way it had in Negusie’s case if it offered an independent, reasoned explanation
based on agency expertise and policy judgment for its interpretation. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170
(Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia wrote:
[I] do not endorse any particular rule. It is to agency officials, not to the
Members of this Court, that Congress has given discretion to choose among
permissible interpretations of the statute. They deserve to be told clearly
whether we are serious about allowing them to exercise that discretion, or are
rather firing a warning shot across the bow.
Id.
86. Id. at 1168.
87. Id. (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–
17 (2002)).
88. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
For a discussion of the Chevron doctrine in the immigration context, see Jeffrey A. Bekiares,
Note, In Country, On Parole, Out of Luck—Regulating Away Alien Eligibility for Adjustment of
Status Contrary to Congressional Intent and Sound Immigration Policy, 58 FLA. L. REV. 713,
721–24 (2006).
89. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1163–64 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 100 (1988); see also Bekiares, supra note 88, at 721.
90. Negusie also highlights the important role oral argument plays in the Court’s decision-
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Constitution in Article III gives courts the power to interpret the law,
courts arguably should not pass this power to the administrative state,
with its entrenched bureaucracy and capture by special interest.91 The
Constitution gives the federal judiciary independence and life-tenure92
precisely so that judges can interpret the law without political
interference.
In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens, the author of the Chevron
doctrine,93 sharply criticized the Court’s transfer of power to the
executive branch.94 He wrote that the Court had distorted the balance
struck in Chevron95—Chevron only instructed courts to defer to the
executive branch when agencies implement policy pursuant to
Congressional authorization. Chevron did not give agencies the power
to replace the federal courts. “Courts are expert at statutory
construction, while agencies are expert at statutory implementation,”
Stevens wrote.96 “That the distinction can be subtle does not lessen its
importance.”97
While Justice Stevens’ distinction appears sound in the abstract, the
broad language of the persecutor bar folds interpretation and
implementation into one step. To give the word “persecute” a moral
dimension, a court must define what type of conduct transforms the
persecuted into a persecutor. Any test the court might create could
making process. Justice Anthony Kennedy, author of the Court’s opinion, forecast his thinking
by asking Negusie’s attorney the first question of the argument about Chevron deference.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (No. 07-499). In
his opinion, Justice Kennedy then seized on the concession in oral argument by Negusie’s
attorney that the BIA could construe a duress defense broadly or narrowly. Negusie, 129 S. Ct.
at 1164. For a discussion of the role of oral argument in decision-making, see Stephen A.
Higginson, Constitutional Advocacy Explains Constitutional Outcomes, 60 FLA. L. REV. 857,
858 (2008), and David A. Karp, Note, Why Justice Thomas Should Speak at Oral Argument, 61
FLA. L. REV. 611 (2009).
91. For a discussion of these questions, see Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 550–51 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron
and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 301, 307–08 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation
and the Courts, 5 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 517, 517 (1986).
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
93. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
94. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1171 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Of
course, the BIA, to which the Attorney General delegates authority, had already interpreted the
statute. But the Court found the BIA’s interpretation invalid because the BIA mechanically—
and incorrectly—relied on Fedorenko as dictating its interpretation. Id. “An agency’s assertion
that it is compelled to adopt a particular interpretation by the statutory text or by judicial
precedents is not reasoned decisionmaking.” Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1,
at 47 (citing FCC v. RCA Commc’ns, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 96 (1953); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80, 89–90 (1943)).
95. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1171.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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hardly capture the range of moral judgments officials must make in
evaluating a political asylum claim. This line drawing between willing
behavior and forced cruelty becomes especially trying when captors
force their victims to switch sides and torture others.
Consider the agonizing cases coming before immigration courts in
the executive branch. One case weighed the political asylum claim of a
child soldier from Uganda, forced into military training at the age of
fifteen.98 Rebel soldiers “forced [the boy] to kill his friend, to watch the
murder of his parents, and to view the mutilation of innocent
civilians.”99 In Ethiopia, a thirteen-year-old boy was given a choice:
serve as a soldier on the Ethiopian front or face abuse in prison, where
jailers hung the boy upside down, burnt him, beat him on the soles of
his feet, and deprived him of food and water.100 Scores of asylum
applications come from countries such as Burma, Columbia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Iraq, Peru, Somalia, and the Sudan, where militia
groups are known to force children into military service. 101
In ordinary cases, courts look to agencies to first interpret
ambiguous statutes based on agency expertise. “The agency can bring
its expertise to bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can
make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed
discussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its
decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.”102 The agency’s
expertise becomes especially useful in cases such as Negusie’s, where
an agency gains insight from evaluating hundreds of asylum claims
from around the world. With this experience, the agency can better
balance foreign policy, humanitarian concerns, and this nation’s
unwillingness to provide refuge to persecutors.
By sending the case back to the Justice Department, the Court
retained its role under Chevron to review the executive branch’s
interpretation and implementation of the persecutor bar. Yet the Court
also strengthened its legitimacy by showing restraint in this case.103 The
Court’s role as an independent and unelected branch becomes most
valuable when the Court reviews laws that protect a politically
powerless minority. But the Court’s place in the constitutional order
98. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 164–65, 168–170 (3d Cir. 2003).
99. Id. at 170.
100. Brief of Human Rights First et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Negusie v.
Holder, at 11–15, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (No. 07-499).
101. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 9–11, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159
(2009) (No. 07-499).
102. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002).
103. For an article illustrating the courts’ failure to clearly interpret another provision of
immigration law, see Natalie Liem, Note, Mean What You Say, Say What You Mean: Defining
the Aggravated Felony Deportation Grounds to Target More Than Aggravated Felons, 59 FLA.
L. REV. 1071, 1084–87 (2007).
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does not carry the same force in certain areas, such as immigration and
foreign policy, where the politically accountable branches have more
expertise and flexibility to implement the people’s will. The Court
wisely placed Negusie’s case in the hands the Justice Department,
which should now devise a humane policy to deal with this daunting
moral dilemma.
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